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INTRODUCTION
From its origins in the Sherman Act of 18901 and the Clayton Act of 1914,2
U.S. antitrust law has prohibited “exclusionary” conduct: conduct by one or
more rivals that has a tendency to impede competition by disadvantaging one
or more competitors. Such conduct can be challenged under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act when it involves concerted action that unreasonably restrains
trade.3 Exclusionary conduct also can be challenged under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act when it constitutes an attempt to monopolize4 or
“monopolization.”5 As one commentator has described it, exclusion has always
been a “core concern” of antitrust law.6
Beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil,7 both
Section 1 and Section 2 have been implemented with a “rule of reason.”8 The
rule of reason has served the essential purpose of differentiating conduct that
might adversely affect a competitor in the normal course of competition from
conduct that handicaps it in a way that significantly impairs the competitive
process. The analysis also generally includes direct or circumstantial evidence

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2018).
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2018).
Examples include concerted refusals to deal and exclusive dealing. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale
Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985) (“This Court has long
held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts are so likely to restrict competition
without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be condemned as per se violations of § 1 of
the Sherman Act.”); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 268 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Under the
rule of reason, an exclusive dealing arrangement will be unlawful only if its ‘probable effect’ is to
substantially lessen competition in the relevant market.”).
4 See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993) (finding that a plaintiff
alleging attempt to monopolize “must prove a dangerous probability of actual monopolization, which
has generally required a definition of the relevant market and examination of market power”).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“A firm violates
§ 2 only when it acquires or maintains, or attempts to acquire or maintain, a monopoly by engaging
in exclusionary conduct . . . .”). Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2018), also prohibits a
variety of exclusionary practices. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 32529 (1961) (discussing the scope and standards for applying Section 3).
6 Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 532 (2013)
(“[A]nticompetitive exclusion, like anticompetitive collusion, must be understood as a core concern
of competition policy.”).
7 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
8 Id. at 61-62; see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d. at 59 (noting that post-Standard Oil, the courts have
applied a “rule of reason” approach to cases arising under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act).
1
2
3
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of “market power,” what Justice Stephen Breyer has described as the ability
to “make a difference” in the marketplace.9
Importantly, and to operationalize it as a useful framework for courts
evaluating competitive effects, the rule of reason has evolved into a
recognized burden-shifting framework that is common to both Section 1 and
Section 2.10 The plaintiff, public or private, must meet an initial burden of
production sufficient to show that the conduct is likely to be anticompetitive.
If it makes that showing, the burden of production shifts to the defendant,
who can undermine the plaintiff’s evidence and thus prevent the burden from
shifting, and/or offer affirmative evidence showing a recognized
procompetitive justification likely to eliminate any anticompetitive tendency
of its conduct. If it does so, the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion, can respond in kind by undermining the defendant’s evidence of
justification, and/or proffering additional evidence to show that the conduct
remains likely to have an unreasonably anticompetitive effect. In the context
of Section 1, this approach has been described as a “continuum” that can vary
in application with the strength of the parties’ respective evidence of probable
competitive harm.11
Despite its origins as a prominent feature of antitrust law, and this shared
framework for evaluating anticompetitive conduct of various forms,
exclusionary conduct has been the focus of far more robust debate over the
last half-century than have many forms of concerted action. Conservative
commentary has long been skeptical of exclusionary conduct allegations, even
those involving firms with substantial market power. This conservative
critique of antitrust law has been highly influential and has facilitated a
transformation of antitrust standards of conduct since the 1970s. The
combination of objections from the business community, conservative
academic criticism, and political change launched a generation-long
movement toward increasingly more permissive standards of conduct.
Although these changes have taken many forms, all were influenced by a
common and repeated message: competition law was over-deterrent. It was
prone to condemn conduct that was likely beneficial in many instances, or
competitively inconsequential at worst.12 Conservatives attributed this
9 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
10 Jonathan B. Baker & Andrew I. Gavil, Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg and Antitrust Law’s Rule(s)
of Reason, in 2 DOUGLAS GINSBURG: AN ANTITRUST PROFESSOR ON THE BENCH (Nicolas
Charbit, ed. forthcoming 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3349853.
11 Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in
Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 759 (2012); see also Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780-81.
12 See generally Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 506, 515-34 (1974) [hereinafter Posner, Exclusionary Practices] (discussing predatory pricing,
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tendency to bright line rules of liability, undemanding burdens of proof of
anticompetitive effect, lack of appreciation for efficiency, and the limited
competence of antitrust decision-makers to correctly differentiate
procompetitive from anticompetitive conduct. These commentators also
espoused a range of assumptions based on their views that previously suspect
types of exclusionary conduct were more likely procompetitive and that
highly concentrated markets were likely to perform well.13
Critics relied heavily on the assumption that the costs of false positive
errors (i.e., erroneous convictions and over-deterrence) far exceeded the costs
of false negatives (i.e., erroneous acquittals and under-deterrence). These
critics further assumed that the effects of false positives would be lasting
because of the enduring impact of court decisions. By contrast, they assumed
that the effects of false negatives would largely be dissipated by the selfcorrecting tendencies of markets.14
The proscribed cure was a combination of greater economic sophistication,
reliance on bright-line rules of non-liability, and lessened reliance on brightline rules of liability. The influence of this approach did not end with the
analysis of particular practices. The goal of preventing false positives provided
a focus for the comparative evaluation of alternative legal rules,15 and became
a barometer for evaluating the scope of antitrust prohibitions.16 This translated
vertical mergers, exclusive dealing, and boycotts); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
13 In this article, we differentiate “assumptions” from “presumptions”—a term of more specific
meaning in the context of litigation and burdens of proof. As we explain in Parts II and III, infra,
many mistaken conservative assumptions have provided the basis for procompetitive presumptions
in antitrust law.
14 For one of the oft-cited illustrations of this set of arguments, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1984). For a criticism of its approach, see Oliver E.
Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 281-89 (1987). For a recent reconsideration of one
of Easterbrook’s foundation premises, that the consequences of false positives will be systematically
more harmful than those of false negatives, see Thomas A. Lambert, The Limits of Antitrust in the 21st
Century, (Univ. of Mo. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 202006, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3533549 (discussing how
Easterbrook’s argument that antitrust should be calibrated to minimize error costs was sound, but
subsequent scholarship has undermined his specific assumption with regard to the relative harm of
false positives and false negatives).
15 See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of ‘Error Cost’ Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s
Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6 (2015) (“Contemporary antitrust conservatives have relied on the
error cost framework to advocate various antitrust rules that would place a ‘thumb on the scales’ in
favor of permitting firms to engage in much of the conduct that Judge Bork perceived as beneficial.”).
16 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (“Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations ‘are especially costly, because
they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.’ . . . The cost of false positives
counsels against an undue expansion of §2 liability.”) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)); Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325,
1333 (7th Cir. 1986) (“A mistaken grant of an injunction may elevate this price, harming the
consumers that antitrust laws are designed to protect.”).
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into a call for a higher evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in cases alleging
exclusionary conduct, which included a requirement of more economic
evidence to support competitive harm allegations.17
Many of the assumptions that guided this generation-long retrenchment
of antitrust rules were mistaken, and advances in the law and in economic
analysis have rendered them anachronistic. This is especially the case with
respect to exclusionary conduct.18 Professors Krattenmaker and Salop showed
that foreclosure conduct is not illusory and can lead to harm to competition
by raising the costs of competitors and allowing the perpetrator to achieve or
maintain monopoly power.19 Professor Kaplow and others showed the errors
in the claim that exclusionary vertical restraints could not be used to extend
or maintain monopoly power.20
As Professor Jonathan Baker has observed, rote invocation of error cost
analysis can itself produce errors, particularly with respect to exclusionary
conduct.21 Continued reliance on what are now exaggerated fears of “false
positives,” and failure adequately to consider the harm from “false negatives,”
have led courts to impose excessive demands of proof on plaintiffs that belie
both established procedural norms and sound economic analysis.22 This does
not result in more reasonable antitrust standards, but instead results in an
embedded ideological preference for non-intervention and a “thumb on the
17 See, e.g., Posner, Exclusionary Practices, supra note 12; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 134-60 (1978) (advocating more demanding standards for demonstrating
injury to competition).
18 See generally Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON.
REV. 388 (1987); B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 64 (1998); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Eric B. Rasmusen et al., Naked
Exclusion, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1137 (1991); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating
Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513 (1995); Michael D. Whinston,
Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990).
19 Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 18, at 230-31 (explaining valid foreclosure theories).
20 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 400-01 (2009) (explaining that absent restrictive assumptions, tying
can increase monopoly profits absent efficiencies); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power
Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985) (explaining the limited applicability of the single
monopoly profit theory).
21 See Baker, supra note 15, at 29-30, 37-38 (“To protect a robust, effective, and socially beneficial
competition policy, antitrust policy must avoid the erroneous application of error cost analysis.”);
see also JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY 73-77 (2019) (discussing the relationship of error-cost analysis to legal presumptions); cf.
Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Symposium, How Do Cartels Use Vertical Restraints?
Horizontal and Vertical Working in Tandem, 83 ANTITRUST L.J. 15 (2020) (analyzing evidence that
cartels use vertical restraints to facilitate horizontal collusion).
22 A recent and potent example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138
S. Ct. 2274, 2284-88 (2018) (denigrating the role of direct evidence of competitive harm and shifting
to the plaintiff the burden to disprove the sufficiency of the defendant’s proffered justifications for
its conduct).
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scales”23 that creates a tendency toward false negatives, particularly in modern
markets characterized by economies of scale and network effects.24 Indeed,
the effect goes well beyond a “thumb on the scales,” because it effectively
shifts the default presumption from neutral to pro-defense. There are also
excessive administrative costs, as ever “more” evidence is demanded, without
regard for its cost or whether it is likely to significantly improve the accuracy
of decisions.
In this article, we build on this prior work to explain how these erroneous
assumptions about markets, institutions, and conduct have distorted the
antitrust decision-making process and produced an excessive risk of false
negatives in exclusionary conduct cases involving firms attempting to achieve,
maintain, or enhance dominance or substantial market power. To redress this
imbalance, we integrate modern economic analyses and the teachings of
decision theory with the foundational conventions of antitrust law; these
conventions have long relied on probability, presumptions, and reasonable
inferences to provide effective means for evaluating competitive effects and
resolving antitrust claims.
In Part I, we review the essential role that probability, presumptions, and
inferences have played in shaping antitrust law’s approach to defining
evidentiary burdens. In Part II, we briefly explain the role decision theory
should play in designing antitrust rules in the context of current case law and
economic learning, and critically examine the Chicago School critiques of
1960s antitrust and explain why their relevance is much reduced today. In Part
III, we propose a series of guiding principles and advocate for easing of the
burdens placed on plaintiffs to establish anticompetitive harm. We propose
eliminating continued reliance on the unwarranted assumptions that have
raised the plaintiff ’s burden in exclusionary conduct cases and tipped the
litigation scales in favor of defendants and provide suggestions for how
procompetitive presumptions might be more narrowly tailored.

See Baker, supra note 15, at 6.
Economies of scale occur when a firm has lower average costs at higher levels of output.
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 36 (4th
ed. 2005). Network effects occur when customers perceive product quality as higher when other
customers purchase the product, for example, in the case of social media. See CARL SHAPIRO &
HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 184
(1999); Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Communications Service, 5 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974).
23
24
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I. THE RULE OF REASON, COMPETITIVE HARM, AND THE ROLE OF
PROBABILITY, INFERENCE, AND PRESUMPTION
A. The Origins of the Rule of Reason
Since its emergence in Standard Oil,25 the rule of reason has been rooted
in probability, not certainty.26 The Supreme Court explained that conduct
could be deemed “unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions” if it
“were of such a character as to give rise to the inference or presumption” that it
was “restraining the free flow of commerce and tending to bring about the evils,
such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be against public
policy.”27 Seven years later, the Court again emphasized the probabilistic
nature of judgments under the rule of reason in Board of Trade of Chicago.28
In Justice Brandeis’s statement of the rule of reason, he explained that the
court “must ordinarily consider . . . the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable.”29
From these two pillars, the modern rule of reason with its focus on
competitive effects later developed in National Society of Professional
Engineers30 and National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n.31 Writing for the Court in
both cases, Justice Stevens drew heavily on Standard Oil and Chicago Board of
Trade, synthesizing the key elements of presumption, inference, and
probability. He explained that unreasonableness could be based on either “the
nature or character of the contracts, or . . . on surrounding circumstances
giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain

Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1911).
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that the
Supreme Court in Standard Oil used the “rule of reason” to “describe the proper inquiry under both”
Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act); Baker & Gavil, supra note 10 (same); see also Steven C. Salop
& R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 617, 647-48, 652 (1999) (suggesting the application of Section 1’s anticompetitive
effects test to Microsoft’s conduct under Section 2).
27 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the use of
“presumption[s]” in interpreting and applying the Sherman Act was rooted in the common law, on
which its core prohibitions were modeled. Id. at 27, 58.
28 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States (Chicago Board of Trade), 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
29 Id. at 238 (emphasis added); see also Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183,
203 n.10 (2010) (“Justice Brandeis provided the classic formulation of the Rule of Reason in Board of
Trade of Chicago v. United States . . . .”).
30 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Professional Engineers also
emphasized that the rule of reason focuses on competitive effects. See id. at 692 (“[T]he purpose of
the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint . . . .”); see also
Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millennium, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 187, 188 (2000) (advocating a “first principles” approach to evaluating market power
and anticompetitive effects).
31 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
25
26
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trade and enhance prices.”32 Probabilistic assessments of likely competitive
harm also are the basis of the “per se rule,” an application of the rule of reason
that irrebuttably presumes conduct will restrain competition unreasonably.33
Although the rule of reason has evolved mainly in the context of Section
1 horizontal restraints law, this learning applies equally to exclusionary
conduct cases under both Sections 1 and 2. The burden-shifting rule of reason
has been used in concerted exclusionary conduct cases like Visa34 and
RealComp II.35 It also has been used to structure the analysis in several leading
Section 2 cases involving single firm conduct, including Microsoft,36
McWane,37 and ZF Meritor.38 Indeed, Standard Oil involved exclusionary
conduct and included claims under both Sections 1 and 2.39
B. Satisfying the Plaintiff ’s Burden of Production
As the rule of reason evolved, this reliance on probabilistic assessments of
likely harm remained one of its core characteristics.40 Per se prohibition was
reserved for conduct with a very high probability of harm. In other cases, the
level of scrutiny and the likelihood of liability were calibrated to the nature
and strength of the evidence of probable harm, whether circumstantial or
direct, as well as presumptions based on the nature of the restraint, experience
and the overarching goals of the Sherman Act.

Prof ’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 690 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[A]greements [highly likely to
be anticompetitive] are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940) (noting that price-fixing
agreements are “banned because of their actual or potential threat” to competition).
34 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238, 240 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding it unlawful
under Section 1 for Visa-member banks collectively to agree that they would not issue competing
American Express or Discover cards).
35 Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 824-25 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that it is
unlawful under Section 1 for members of a multiple listing service to impede consumer access to
information about non-traditional real estate services offered by on-line brokers).
36 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Viamedia, Inc.
v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 463-64 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying Microsoft’s burden-shifting
framework under Section 2).
37 McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 833 (11th Cir. 2015).
38 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 281 (3d Cir. 2012).
39 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1911).
40 See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (finding that the “blanket
license” utilized by ASCAP and BMI did not warrant per se condemnation because the practice was
not a “naked restraint” that “always or almost always” tended to unreasonably restrain competition);
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50, 50 n.16 (1977) (holding that the use of a per
se approach to the rule of reason should be limited to conduct that is “manifestly anticompetitive” and
noting that “[t]he probability that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the
severity of those consequences must be balanced against its pro-competitive consequences”).
32
33
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Presumptions have consistently played a role in antitrust law when the
prediction of competitive harm is deemed sound and, in some cases, when
combined with some limited market-specific analysis.41 NCAA, Indiana
Federation of Dentists,42 and California Dental43 further developed that longstanding role, clarifying the respective burdens of the parties to antitrust
litigation. A plaintiff can meet its burden of production through a rebuttable
anticompetitive presumption when economic theory predicts a relatively high
or “obvious” probability of competitive harm.44 Courts also recognized that a
plaintiff could meet its burden of production for competitive harm with a
“double inference”45: courts could infer market power from high market
shares and other factors in a defined market; combining this inference with
conduct that has a tendency to be anticompetitive, competitive harm could
then be inferred—precisely because that tendency increases in the presence
of market power.46 Finally, the Supreme Court has also recognized that when
direct evidence of probable anticompetitive effect is proffered, neither
presumption nor inference is required.47
In evidentiary terms, direct evidence of probable competitive harm can
eliminate the need to rely on circumstantial evidence, and hence either
presumption or inference.48 This is not, however, a short cut or “quick look”

41 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-94 (1978); Polygram
Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
42 FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
43 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
44 Id. at 770; see also Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36-37. The strongest rule of reason cases from
the perspective of the plaintiff will include both direct and circumstantial evidence of harm. See, e.g.,
Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 827-34 (6th Cir. 2011) (evaluating both direct and
circumstantial evidence of competitive harm under the rule of reason). The Supreme Court’s
decisions in NCAA and Indiana Federation of Dentists were part of a larger movement to alleviate the
burden of production (and proof) on plaintiffs in cases involving relatively more obvious
anticompetitive conduct. See Gavil, supra note 11, at 755-57.
45 For an explanation of this “double inference” method of establishing competitive harm, see
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 544-45 (3d ed. 2017).
46 See, e.g., Realcomp II, 635 F.3d at 823 (“Realcomp’s substantial market power, combined with
the likely anticompetitive tendencies of its policies, rendered the policies unreasonable due to their
likely anticompetitive effects.”).
47 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109
(1984) (“[W]hen there is an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, ‘no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.’”)
(quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)); Ind. Fed’n of Dentists,
476 U.S. at 460-61 (“‘[P]roof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output,’ can obviate
the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a ‘surrogate for detrimental effects.’”)
(quoting 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1511, at 429 (3d ed. 1986)).
48 Similarly, courts in conspiracy cases do not rely on “plus factor” analysis to infer agreement
when there is direct evidence of agreement, such as bylaws, a contract, or communications revealing
a conspiracy. See, e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661-62 (7th
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that somehow avoids a showing of market power.49 Quite to the contrary,
when direct evidence of competitive harm is available, market power also has
been shown.50 As understood by the lower courts, the Supreme Court did not
suggest that such direct proof was a requirement of rule of reason analysis,
but rather that such proof met the plaintiff ’s burden of production and hence
eliminated the necessity of reliance on circumstantial evidence.51
Indeed, direct evidence of anticompetitive effects on price and output also
can be sufficient to rebut a defendant’s efficiency justifications. When direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects has been shown (and not undermined),
the plaintiff in effect has preemptively shown that any procompetitive
benefits were inadequate to eliminate the demonstrated anticompetitive
effects in the market.52
C. The “Enquiry Meet for the Case”
In moving away from reliance on bright line approaches, the courts
continued to use probability assessments to apply the rule of reason flexibly,
depending on the strength of the evidence presented by the parties and by
recognizing appropriate presumptions. A more precise statement of the “per
se rule,” for example, is “per se unreasonableness”—an application of the rule
of reason that involves an irrebuttable presumption that the conduct is highly
likely to unreasonably restrain competition.53 Similarly, what has been
labelled the “quick look” can be understood as courts utilizing a rebuttable
presumption when the probability of competitive harm is relatively high,
albeit not as high as with per se unreasonableness.

Cir. 2002) (explaining that direct evidence in Section 1 conspiracy is “evidence tantamount to an
acknowledgment of guilt”).
49 Assembling direct evidence of harm is not necessarily “quick,” relative to the circumstantial
route. Obtaining direct proof may require significant investigation and evidence gathering. Direct
proof also is likely to involve different economic methods, although there may be overlap with direct
evidence of market power.
50 Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text; infra
note 114 and accompanying text.
51 See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (interpreting
Supreme Court decisions as rejecting the argument that a quick look approach is only available when
evidence of actual harm is proffered).
52 See, e.g., Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461 (“[T]he finding of actual, sustained adverse
effects on competition in those areas where IFD dentists predominated, viewed in light of the reality
that markets for dental services tend to be relatively localized, is legally sufficient to support a finding
that the challenged restraint was unreasonable even in the absence of elaborate market analysis.”).
53 This view was not entirely new, as the Court had observed in the late 1950s that what was
being referred to as the “per se rule” was a “principle of per se unreasonableness.” N. Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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This approach reached fruition in California Dental.54 The Supreme Court
made it clear that the rule of reason is a sliding-scale and that evidence of
anticompetitive effects varies and must be evaluated in the context of each
case.55 The strength of any presumption of competitive harm affects the
burden on the plaintiff to undertake market analysis. It also correspondingly
affects the defendant’s evidentiary burden to rebut evidence or presumption
of harm. This is the “enquiry meet for the case.”56 It synthesized the Court’s
previous decisions describing the rule of reason inquiry as focused on the
probability—on tendencies—of competitive harm.57 But as the 5-4 division
in the Court illustrated, that formulation leaves room for disagreements about
the quantity and quality of evidence needed to support an inference of
probable competitive harm.
D. Developing New Presumptions
The rule of reason and its presumptions should continue to evolve over
time as economic learning advances and courts gain further experience with
industries and firm practices. The decisions of Leegin58 and Actavis59 invited
lower courts to consider the adoption of appropriate presumptions based on
experience in applying the rule of reason (respectively) to intrabrand vertical
price agreements and pay-for-delay cases.60 In this regard, after discussing
the decision theory framework and examining certain assumptions made by
conservative commentators and the presumptions that flow from those
assumptions, we propose principles to guide the evolution of the rule of
reason for exclusionary conduct in today’s modern marketplace. Our goal is
to avoid the excessive false negatives that are highly likely to flow from unduly

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 758 (1999).
Id. at 779-81; see also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159-60 (2013).
Cal. Dental Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 781.
This approach also aligned the rule of reason as applied under Section 1 with the structured
approaches that the Court, and the lower courts, had been developing in other areas of antitrust law,
including monopolization under Section 2 and mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. See
Baker & Gavil, supra note 10.
58 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99 (2007) (“Courts
can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to
make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote
procompetitive ones.” (emphasis added)).
59 Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159-60.
60 The Court defined “intrabrand competition,” in Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 52 n.19 (1977), stating that “[i]nterbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers
of the same generic product—television sets in this case—and is the primary concern of antitrust
law. . . . In contrast, intrabrand competition is the competition between the distributors—wholesale
or retail—of the product of a particular manufacturer.” “Pay-for-delay” agreements, also referred to
as “reverse payment” agreements, are explained and examined in Actavis, 570 U.S. 136.
54
55
56
57
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permissive antitrust rules grounded in outdated non-interventionist
presumptions and assumptions.
II. ACHIEVING A SOUND DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO
ANTITRUST LEGAL STANDARDS FOR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
A. Decision Theory and Probabilistic Competitive Harm
It has been recognized for decades that decision theory is useful for
understanding and formulating legal standards.61 Making legal decisions
based on probability, inferences, and presumptions is consistent with a
decision-theoretic approach to legal rules. Decision theory provides a
methodology for information-gathering and decision-making when outcomes
are uncertain, information is inherently imperfect, and information is costly
to obtain. This methodology is a rational process in which a decision-maker
begins with initial beliefs (i.e., presumptions) based on prior knowledge and
then gathers additional information (i.e., evidence) to supplement the
presumption in order to make a better, more accurate decision.62
Decision theory recognizes that some erroneous decisions are inevitable
because it is not economical, or even possible, to achieve perfect information.
Even if the evidence suggests that the conduct in a particular case is
beneficial, the conduct actually may be harmful, or vice versa. Formulating an
optimal legal standard would involve balancing to the extent possible the
expected consumer welfare harm from “false positive” errors (i.e., erroneously
prohibiting beneficial conduct) versus “false negative” errors (i.e.,
erroneously permitting harmful conduct). Analysis of error costs would
require information on the incidence and consequences of error. The analysis
also would take into account the impact of the legal rule on deterrence, that
is, on future participants’ choice of conduct in light of the legal standard.63 It
61 There is a large literature on the application of decision theory to antitrust. See, e.g., C.
Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 Antitrust L.J. 41
(1999); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257 (1974). For further discussion of its application in assigning burdens of proof, see Edward
K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254 (2013) and Louis Kaplow, Burden
of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012).
62 See, e.g., John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 108486 (1968); MORRIS H. DEGROOT, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS 135-40 (1970); HOWARD
RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY
27-33 (1968). In the language of Bayesian probability theory, the decision-maker begins with a
“prior” probability, gathers information, and then forms a “posterior” probability by rationally
combining the prior probability and the information. Here we are not using “presumption” in the
formal legal sense, but as a synonym for “assumptions” or “priors.”
63 Deterrence effects are distinguishable from the issue of judicial errors for a given legal
standard. For example, a rule of per se legality would be easy to administer and would not lead a
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also could take into account the cost of the administrative process, including
the cost of delay.
Presumptions also play a key role in setting evidentiary burdens under
the rule of reason. The recognition of a presumption is a question of law. The
court would identify and gauge the strength of its initial economic
presumption regarding the likely competitive impact of the conduct. This
presumption would be rationally based on logic, experience, and economic
evidence about the industry and the category of conduct.64 The presumption
regarding the category of conduct could be anticompetitive, procompetitive,
or neutral (i.e., equally likely to be anticompetitive or procompetitive). The
strength of the presumption would vary with the degree of variation in the
likely effects of the conduct. Because any single district court is likely to have
very limited information about the probable categorical effects of conduct,
appellate courts and the Supreme Court are better positioned to make
judgments about presumptions. The recognition and formulation of
presumptions, therefore, should be left to appellate courts, the Supreme
Court, and Congress, with district courts constrained to their role as implementers.
A legal standard can be characterized as the combination of the evidentiary
preconditions that will trigger a presumption and an evidentiary standard to
rebut the presumption.65 The optimal evidentiary standard would balance the
direction and strength of the presumption with the reliability and cost of the
available evidence. For example, suppose that the presumption is that some
category of conduct is more likely harmful.66 A court could reflect this
district court to issue erroneous “false convictions.” But such a legal standard might not be optimal
because it would not deter any anticompetitive conduct in that category. For discussion of
deterrence, see Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ.
L. REV. 557, 580, 593 (2013). False positives as well as false negatives tend to lead to under-deterrence
of anticompetitive conduct in some circumstances. See Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlement and
Enforcement Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2647, 266869, 2669 n.60 (2013) (explaining that compliance incentives decrease when the probability of error
of either type increases).
64 A key assumption of decision theory is that the initial presumptions of the court are rational
and accurate. Confirmation bias involves (unconsciously) interpreting evidence as supporting one’s
prior views, which amounts to dysfunctional Bayesian inference. See, e.g., Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 211 (1998)
(“Our natural tendency seems to be to look for evidence that is directly supportive of hypotheses
we favor and even, in some instances, of those we are entertaining but about which [we] are
indifferent.”).
65 These evidentiary rebuttal standards would include the respective burdens of pleading,
production, and proof for plaintiffs and defendants.
66 Such a presumption might not be as simple as “conduct A is so likely to be anticompetitive
that we presume it will be,” as is the case for some per se prohibitions. It might instead be that
“conduct A, in the presence of facts B, C, and D, is highly likely to be anticompetitive.” Such
qualified presumptions have been used by the Supreme Court in connection with certain kinds of
group boycotts, see Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
295-97 (1985) (“Unless the cooperative possesses market power or exclusive access to an element
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presumption (i) by treating the presumption as sufficient to satisfy the
plaintiff’s initial burden, or (ii) by placing a relatively low burden of production
of case-specific evidence on the plaintiff. The court also might place a higher
burden of production or even persuasion on the defendant to rebut the
plaintiff’s presumption and case-specific evidence. A stronger presumption and
evidence of harm would raise the defendant’s rebuttal burden. The plaintiff’s
burden of producing evidence of competitive harm analogously would be
higher for presumptively procompetitive categories of conduct.
The cost of information also suggests the potential benefits from a
structured and sometimes truncated process.67 As we have noted, the term
“per se illegality” describes an irrebuttable presumption of harm for certain
categories of conduct. The FTC and some courts have used the term
“inherently suspect,” a term first used by the Supreme Court in the context
of merger analysis,68 to describe conduct that warrants a strong but rebuttable
presumption of likely harm, given certain other conditions.69 In some cases,
the presumption may be insufficient by itself to shift the burden, but might
have a supporting role along with other case-specific evidence. Thus, this
decision-theoretic approach can be used to interpret and extend the “sliding
scale” approach to applying the rule of reason even in the absence of an
anticompetitive presumption.
essential to effective competition, the conclusion that expulsion is virtually always likely to have an
anticompetitive effect is not warranted.”), and tying arrangements, see Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-16 (1984) (“[W]e have condemned tying arrangements when the seller has
some special ability—usually called ‘market power’—to force a purchaser to do something that he
would not do in a competitive market.”). They similarly are used in merger law, where the
anticompetitive presumption depends on the level of concentration and market shares of the
merging firms as well as the change in concentration that the proposed merger will bring about.
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
67 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990) (“[T]he justification
for these per se rules is rooted in administrative convenience.”); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that the per se presumption “avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved,
as well as related industries”).
68 Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363 (explaining that the use of a presumption in the context of
merger analysis “lightens the burden of proving illegality only with respect to mergers whose size
makes them inherently suspect in light of Congress’ design in § 7 to prevent undue concentration”).
69 See N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 358-61 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying an
inherently suspect “‘quick-look’ rule-of-reason analysis” to a case of alleged horizontal price-fixing
activities); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32-33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[C]onduct that
‘appears likely, absent an efficiency justification, to restrict competition and decrease output’–is to be
presumed unreasonable.” (quoting Polygram Holding, Inc. Docket No. 9298, 22-24 (F.T.C. July 28,
2003)
(Opinion
of
the
Commission),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2003/07/polygramopinion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y77R-GNDU]); In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass’n, 955 F.2d 457, 459, 470-71 (6th Cir.
1992) (applying the approach to auto dealerships charged with anticompetitive action in keeping their
showrooms closed certain days of the week).
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Under the rule of reason, it might be useful to limit the amount of
information necessary to evaluate competitive effect. Demanding more
information in some cases can lead to more errors or worsened deterrence.
Certain evidence may not be reasonably available or will be unreliable because
it (i) too often signals an erroneous conclusion, or (ii) is too likely subject to
confusion, misinterpretation, or bias by the trial court or jury.70 Collecting
and presenting additional information is not costless and may have
diminishing returns and only marginal benefits, if any.71 Moreover, requiring
additional evidence disadvantages the plaintiff, which has the initial burden
and the ultimate burden of proof. It also can deter meritorious cases, leading
to under-deterrence.
B. The Chicago School’s Reliance on Decision Theory to Support Its Critique of
Antitrust
Chicago School commentators applied a decision-theoretic framework to
argue that antitrust law as it existed in the 1960s tended toward false positives,
including over-deterrence of beneficial conduct. They attributed this
tendency to a lack of appreciation for efficiency benefits of the allegedly
anticompetitive conduct, undemanding burdens of proof on plaintiffs, bright
line liability rules, and the limited competence and bias of antitrust
decisionmakers (i.e., agencies, courts, and juries) in evaluating competitive
effects. These commentators also assumed that the costs of false positives far
exceeded the costs of false negatives because any anticompetitive effects from
underenforcement (false negatives) would be dissipated by the self-correcting
tendencies of markets, whereas any anticompetitive effects of overenforcement (false positives) would prove durable due to the longevity of
legal precedent.72

70 See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”); see also FED. R. EVID. 702(c) (expert opinion testimony can be excluded if is not “the
product of reliable principles and methods”).
71 The collection of evidence should be “proportional to the needs of the case,” including
“whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(1). See also Andrew I. Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1 ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 125, 129 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) (“[T]he question
would be whether the marginal contribution to accuracy of outcome (reduction of error) derived
from additional process would be outweighed by the costs required to gather, present, and evaluate
additional information.”).
72 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 2. For a more recent example, see generally Murat C.
Mungan & Joshua Wright, Optimal Standards of Proof in Antitrust 3 (George Mason Univ. Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 19-20, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428771.
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They were especially skeptical of anticompetitive concerns regarding
exclusionary conduct. They suggested that complaining rivals were highly
likely to be inefficient competitors, who were attempting to use antitrust to
prevent more efficient larger firms from competing on the merits to the
benefit of consumers.73 Intrabrand vertical restraints were assumed to be
procompetitive in most cases and potential exclusionary effects were
dismissed or ignored.74 Interbrand restraints, such as exclusive dealing, were
assumed to be generally efficient, even if used by firms with substantial
market power.75 Robert Bork argued that foreclosure was illusory and could
not harm competition because there was only a single monopoly profit.76
Commentators have also suggested that monopolists drive innovation.77
These criticisms and the proposed solution of more permissive antitrust
rules and higher burdens of proof have been highly influential. Intrabrand
vertical restraints are no longer condemned, per se, as is also true for most
exclusionary group boycotts. The per se prohibition of tying is teetering.78

73 See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28
J.L. & ECON. 247, 248 (1985) (describing how firms seek antitrust protection from “the
unpleasantness of effective competition”); Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 35 (cautioning courts to
“treat suits by horizontal competitors with the utmost suspicion”).
74 See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason,
60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (1991); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
75 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How
Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 473, 519
(2007) (describing circumstances in which exclusive dealing can be deemed efficient); Benjamin
Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition for Distribution, 75 ANTITRUST
L.J. 433, 435 (2008) (explaining how exclusive dealing can mitigate issues with contracting directly
with retailers); Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L & ECON. 1, 3-4 (1982) (“The most
commonly expressed view of exclusive dealing in the literature portrays it as a device to obtain
increased dealer promotional effort.”).
76 BORK, supra note 17, at 137-38, 140, 372-73.
77 Scholars have critiqued this argument. See Baker, supra note 15, at 13-14 (“This ‘dynamic
competition’ defense of concentrated markets, or of conduct allowing firms to create or maintain
market power, is unconvincing because it ignores several important ways that greater competition
enhances incentives to innovate.”); see also Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction v. Extension:
The Basis for Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L
285, 290-92 (2008).
78 “Tying” involves the sale of a product or service only on the condition that the buyer also
purchase a second, unwanted product or service. Traditionally the practice was treated as per se
unlawful when certain conditions were also present. See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984) (“Per se condemnation—condemnation without inquiry into actual market
conditions—is only appropriate if the existence of forcing is probable. Thus, application of the per
se rule focuses on the probability of anticompetitive consequences.” (footnote omitted)). But more
recently courts have been reluctant to use the per se approach in other circumstances. See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (declining to apply per se approach
to platform software).
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Encouraged by Matsushita79 and Twombly,80 motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment are now more commonly made. Courts and agencies also
have become more sophisticated in evaluating economic arguments.
Economic testimony is now the norm and subject to Daubert challenges.81
The assumptions underlying these criticisms also have been very
influential in producing a non-interventionist bias in the law. For example, in
Brooke Group, the Court expressed skepticism that the cigarette oligopolists
would be able to coordinate successfully after disciplining a price-cutting
rival, despite evidence that they had coordinated historically.82 The single
monopoly profit theory was treated as a broad guide in Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Jefferson Parish83 and subsequent opinions by Justices Breyer
and Sotomayor when they were appellate judges, leading them to reach
potentially erroneous conclusions about probable exclusionary effects.84 The
Supreme Court’s analysis in Trinko85 is partially based on the belief that
monopolists are the main engines of future innovation and should be
permitted to restrict competition to maintain their innovation incentives.86
Several courts concluded that exclusive dealing contracts with durations of
one year or less should be treated as presumptively lawful on the ground that
they are easily contestable.87

79 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88 (1986) (revitalizing
the use of summary judgment in antitrust cases).
80 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-57 (2007) (raising the burden of pleading for
plaintiffs to state a claim under Federal Rule 8(a)(2)).
81 See, e.g., In re Wholesale Grocery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 946 F.3d 995, 1000-03 (8th Cir.
2019) (finding that the district court did not abuse discretion in applying principles of Daubert and
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to exclude testimony of plaintiff ’s expert economist).
82 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 232 (1993)
(“[R]elying on tacit coordination among oligopolists as a means of recouping losses from predatory
pricing is ‘highly speculative’”). But see id. at 253-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
evidence was sufficient to show the required “reasonable possibility” of harm to competition).
83 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 466 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The existence of
a tied product normally does not increase the profit that the seller with market power can extract
from sales of the tying product.”).
84 E & L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus. Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 30 (2d Cir. 2006) (Winter, Pooler,
and Sotomayor, JJ.); Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer, C.J.).
85 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
86 Id. at 407 (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what
attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth.”). For a critique of Trinko, see Andrew Gavil’s observation that, “it is perhaps
worth inquiring whether the presumed connection between the dream of monopoly and innovation
is in fact warranted as a general proposition.” Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by
Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 41-51 (2004).
87 See, e.g., Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Exclusivedealing contracts terminable in less than a year are presumptively lawful . . . .”). For a discussion of the
relevant cases and the critique of this view, see GAVIL, ET AL. supra note 45, at 1038-39.
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C. The Errors and Inapplicability of the Chicago School Prescriptions for Current
Antitrust Analysis
While the Chicago School’s analysis provided useful criticisms of 1960s legal
standards, they have gone too far in various ways. Modern economic analysis
has now invalidated many of their criticisms.88 The overarching assumption that
false positives are more concerning than false negatives due to rapid market selfcorrection is undermined by the observation that long-lasting cartels with a
significant number of participants have been observed. Market dominance can
be quite durable, in some instances lasting for decades. Barriers to entry,
specifically including barriers resulting from the incumbent monopolist’s
exclusionary conduct, can prevent market self-correction.89
Chicagoans argued that competitor complaints were most likely
motivated by the fear of increased competition, which has led to skepticism
of such complaints, including a recommendation of denial of standing,90 and
has been extended to promote ex ante credibility judgments of witnesses,
both positive and negative.91 In fact, the interests of competitors whose costs
are raised by exclusionary conduct are consistent with the interests of
consumers whose prices are raised as a result. While antitrust protects
“competition, not competitors,” that does not mean that competitors’
interests necessarily are opposed to consumer interests or that courts should
categorically discount the fate of competitors. This oft-repeated refrain is
especially self-serving and suspect when the conduct of a firm with

88 For an excellent catalogue of these assumptions as they relate both to markets and
institutions, see Baker, supra note 15, at 8-36 (analyzing nine such “erroneous assumptions”). See also
Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 528 (2013)
(“Mainstream and progressive commentators also call collusion the central antitrust problem,
although post-Chicago commentators tend more than most to take exclusionary conduct seriously.”
(footnote omitted)).
89 See BAKER, supra note 21, at 17 (citing evidence that cartels, oligopolies, and monopolies have
been more durable than predicted by Chicago School critics); see also Steven C. Salop, The Raising
Rivals’ Cost Foreclosure Paradigm, Conditional Pricing Practices, and the Flawed Incremental Price-Cost Test,
81 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 391-92 (2017) (describing how foreclosure can be used to thwart marketcorrecting entry); see also McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 838 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting FTC’s finding
that McWane’s conduct harmed competition by making effective entry more costly and difficult).
90 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 106, 122 (1986) (finding that the
allegations of the nation’s fifth-largest beef packing company about the results of a merger of the
second and third largest beef packing companies were insufficient to show a threat of antitrust injury
as a result of predatory pricing necessary to enjoin the merger under the Clayton Act); see also
Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 33-39.
91 Some courts have openly questioned the credibility of witnesses employed by the plaintiff as
self-interested, yet credited, without similar scrutiny, the testimony of the obviously self-interested
parties defending their conduct. See, e.g., United States v. AT & T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 227,
229-30 (D.D.C. 2018), aff ’d sub nom. United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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substantial market power has the effect of excluding a rival that is the
embodiment of market “self-correction.”92
Modern analysis also has invalidated the Chicagoan critiques of
exclusionary conduct by firms with substantial market power. The claim that
anticompetitive exclusion would be unprofitable because there is only a single
monopoly profit has been shown to be invalid except in one highly unrealistic
set of market conditions.93 It also overlooks the fact that exclusionary conduct
can insulate a firm with legitimately-achieved monopoly power from new
competitive threats that might weaken or undo its market dominance.94 The
idea that entrants can overcome exclusives simply by outbidding monopolists
for needed inputs fails to recognize that entrants face disadvantages in bidding
against monopolists that hold exclusives, even if the exclusives are only shortterm.95 This is because a dominant firm typically has more profits to protect
by maintaining its monopoly rather than facing a competitive market than an
entrant can gain by achieving viability in a competitive market.96
Chicagoans similarly overlook a key fact about private antitrust litigation
that flows from the asymmetric effects of competition on the profits of the
incumbent monopolist versus an entrant or small competitor. Antitrust
defendants typically have systematically higher litigation stakes than do
private plaintiffs. This asymmetry distorts litigation incentives and likely
leads to a higher incidence of false negative errors. In an exclusionary conduct
matter, for example, the defendant attempts to maintain or increase its ability
to exercise market power. Its litigation stakes from an injunction are equal to
92 See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 951 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n a
concentrated market with very high barriers to entry, competition will not exist without competitors.”).
93 For a detailed exposition of these conditions, including examples of when the single
monopoly profit theory would not hold, see GAVIL ET. AL., supra note 45, at 959-65. See also Kaplow,
supra note 20, at 515 (“There are a number of deficiencies in the analysis of recent commentators
who have attempted to proclaim the death of leverage theory.”); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note
18, at 224 (“Nor can one dismiss these claims of anticompetitive effect with the argument that there
is only a single monopoly profit and that ‘leverage’ is impossible.”).
94 See Kaplow, supra note 20, at 520-21; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 18, at 246. For a study
on how the tying of complementary products can create monopolistic positions, see Dennis W.
Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in
Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002).
95 See Salop, supra note 89, at 407-15 (“The predatory pricing paradigm and the conventional
rationale for the [incremental price-cost] test assume that bidding for distributors or customers takes
place on a level playing field. This assumption is generally not the case. A dominant incumbent firm
has significant bidding advantages.”). This mistake was evident in Judge Easterbrook’s decision in
Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chi. Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996), where he concluded that a
rival excluded by exclusive contracts should “try to outbid” the two dominant incumbents “in the
marketplace, rather than to outmaneuver them in court.”
96 Salop, supra note 89, at 408-10. In addition, distributors’ fears that the entrant will fail can
become a self-fulfilling prophecy by leading them to accept exclusives from the monopolist even if
the entrant offers a premium. Id. at 395.
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the reduction in profits from its resulting loss in market power. An entrant
attempting to weaken that market power by enjoining the conduct so that it
can compete in the more competitive market has stakes equal to its
competitive profits. These stakes are highly asymmetric because competitive
profits typically are much lower than monopoly profits. They also are
asymmetric because the benefits of the injunction often would be shared with
other competitors. Damages (even if trebled) are a one-to-one transfer
payment, which raise the stakes equally to both parties but do not eliminate
the asymmetric stakes from the injunction.97
Because a defendant with substantial market power has higher stakes in
an exclusionary conduct case, it has systematic incentives to invest in higher
litigation effort than the plaintiff in order to tilt the outcome somewhat in its
favor, relative to the underlying merits of the case. These asymmetric
litigation investment incentives lead the defendant to provide more evidence
to the court than does the plaintiff, and the court to treat this additional
evidence as weakening the plaintiff ’s case, so that the court is less likely to
find for the plaintiff relative to the underlying merits of the plaintiff ’s case.
As a result, judicial outcomes will involve relatively more false negatives and
relatively fewer false positives, which also will lead to under-deterrence.98
Many rules of procedure and evidence, despite judicial oversight, also provide
ample opportunities for strategic use of litigation to delay, raise plaintiffs’
litigation costs, and further tilt outcomes.99 Moreover, by the time a case is
decided, a rival may have exited the market or been so hobbled that it no
longer poses a significant competitive threat, which renders injunctive relief
ineffective. These factors collectively reduce the plaintiff ’s incentive to bring
suit, which leads to further under-deterrence.
It has long been recognized that the pursuit of monopoly spurs
innovation.100 However, this argument is sometimes misinterpreted to
97 Treble damages do increase the incentive to bring cases, which can increase deterrence. But
they are unlikely to offset the other deterrence-reducing effects.
98 For further analysis, see Erik Hovenkamp & Steven C. Salop, Asymmetric Stakes in
Antitrust Litigation, (June 10, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3563843. See also Avery Katz, Judicial
Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1988); Svetoslav Salkin,
Rent Seeking with Asymmetric Players: An Application to Litigation Expenditures, EUR. J. LEGAL STUD.,
Winter 2013, at 203. An analogous analysis explains how asymmetric stakes in patent races favor the
incumbent monopolist. See Richard J. Gilbert and David M. G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and
the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514 (1982).
99 These can include motions to dismiss and challenges to standing and antitrust injury,
aggressive opposition to various aspects of discovery and to class certification, efforts to exclude
necessary expert testimony, motions for summary judgment, and post-trial motions.
100 See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, DEMOCRACY 110 (1942):

Was not the observed performance due to that stream of inventions that
revolutionized the technique of production rather than to the businessman’s hunt for
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suggest that monopoly, once achieved, benefits consumers because the
monopolist’s future innovation incentives exceed the incentives of their
would-be rivals.101 In fact, monopolists and dominant firms have less
incentive to innovate because they already have a monopoly market share,
whereas fringe competitors have the potential to grow their shares. What
mainly incentivizes a dominant firm is the fear of losing out to new
competitors.102 Moreover, that fear can also incentivize the monopolist to
engage in exclusionary conduct to erect barriers against these potential
innovators. This incentive can be further amplified if the plaintiff ’s standard
of proof has been raised based on mistaken assumptions. The combination of
a desire to preserve monopoly profits, awareness that the potential plaintiff ’s
burden of proof will be demanding, and the possibility that innovating rivals
may not be able to foot the cost of protracted litigation and survive in the
marketplace all combine to insulate monopolists from challenge.103
There are exceptions to the judicial success of these noninterventionist
assumptions about exclusionary conduct. In Actavis, the Court recognized that
an innovator that legitimately has obtained a patent monopoly should not be
permitted to strike agreements with potential entrants that would exclude them
profits? The answer is in the negative. The carrying into effect of those technological
novelties was of the essence of that hunt. And even the inventing itself . . . was a
function of the capitalist process which is responsible for the mental habits that will
produce invention. It is therefore quite wrong . . . to say, as so many economists do,
that capitalist enterprise was one, and technological progress a second, distinct factor
in the observed development of output; they were essentially one and the same thing
or, as we may also put it, the former was the propelling force of the latter.
See also Giulio Federico, Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming
and Protecting Disruption, in 20 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 125, 125 (Josh Lerner &
Scott Stern eds. 2020) (“The goal of antitrust policy is to protect and promote a vigorous
competitive process. Effective rivalry spurs firms to introduce new and innovative products, as they
seek to capture profitable sales from their competitors and to protect their existing sales from future
challengers. In this fundamental way, competition promotes innovation.”).
101 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (“The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth.”). This view arguably signaled a departure from the attitude about monopoly power
reflected in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., where the court wrote that “[m]any people believe
that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses
energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial
progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let
well enough alone.” 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
102 Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?, in THE RATE AND
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 361, 376-92 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds.,
2012) (reviewing evidence).
103 For a more comprehensive discussion of the debate over innovation incentives, see Jonathan
B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575
(2007). See also infra note 123.
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from the market for some period of time.104 In Leegin, the Court recognized
exclusionary conduct concerns from resale price maintenance—it explained
how vertical restraints can be used to maintain single firm market power by
foreclosing innovative retailers or manufacturers.105 Similarly, several circuit
courts have recognized the significant anticompetitive concerns from exclusive
dealing and similar conduct by firms with substantial market power, especially
when implemented in response to new competitive challenges.106
In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit explained how exclusionary conduct can erect
anticompetitive entry barriers to innovative, nascent competitors,107 and
endorsed a structured, burden-shifting framework for evaluating exclusionary
conduct akin to the Section 1 rule of reason standard that requires defendants to
establish procompetitive justifications for their conduct once the plaintiff has
met its initial burden of showing anticompetitive effects.108 In ZF Meritor, the
Third Circuit declined to apply a Brooke Group-style price/cost test109 to loyalty
discounts accompanied by other exclusionary contract restrictions, relying
instead on a similar, burden-shifting structure.110 In McWane, the Eleventh
Circuit also applied a Section 1 rule of reason approach to exclusive dealing and
declined to adopt a procompetitive presumption.111 The courts in both McWane
and Dentsply found that the claimed efficiency benefits were invalid or nonexistent, as did the Microsoft court for most of the challenged restraints.112
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013).
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007) (“A dominant
retailer, for example, might request resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in distribution
that decreases costs.”); see also John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, Raising Retailers’ Profits: On Vertical
Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 672 (2014) (examining exclusionary uses of
minimum resale price maintenance and other vertical contracting practices).
106 See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 827 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Exclusive dealing]
arrangements can harm competition in certain circumstances . . . .”); see also ZF Meritor, LLC v.
Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 270 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The primary antitrust concern with exclusive dealing
arrangements is that they may be used by a monopolist to strengthen its position, which may
ultimately harm competition.”); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“The economic impact of an exclusive dealing arrangement is amplified in the stagnant, no growth
context of the artificial tooth field.”); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir.
2002) (“[Plaintiff] presented sufficient evidence that USTC sought to achieve its goals of excluding
competition and competitors’ products by . . . . [E]nter[ing] into exclusive agreements with retailers
in an effort to exclude rivals’ products.”).
107 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
108 Id. at 58-59.
109 Brooke Group established a two-part the test for predatory pricing that requires evidence of
both below cost pricing and a probability that the alleged predator will be able to later recoup its
losses. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993).
110 ZF Meritor, 696 F.3d at 277 (“[B]ecause price itself was not the clearly predominant
mechanism of exclusion, the price-cost test cases are inapposite, and the rule of reason is the proper
framework within which to evaluate Plaintiffs’ claims.”).
111 McWane, 783 F.3d at 833-35.
112 Id. at 840-42; United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2005);
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 62-64, 66-67, 71-72.
104
105
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Despite this progress, the skeptical assumptions of some conservatives
continue to run deep in antitrust analysis and law. Plaintiffs continue to face
arguments about conduct, institutions, and market structure to persuade
courts to impose overly demanding burdens of production and proof. Most
recently, in Ohio v. American Express Co., the Court declined to rely on direct
evidence of anticompetitive effect of the challenged exclusionary vertical
restraints in the context of a two-sided platform.113 It instead mandated that
proof of market power through circumstantial evidence in the form of a
defined relevant market was also required despite the fact that the direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects on consumers also proved that the
defendant had market power.114
In light of this history, the time has come to consider more systematically
how a more modern analysis should be combined with the insights of decision
theory to update antitrust presumptions and the burden of proof placed on
plaintiffs under the rule of reason in exclusionary conduct challenges. In this
way, the sliding-scale “enquiry meet for the case” can be formulated for the
current market environment. Analysis based on mistaken assumptions and
mistaken applications of decision theory are particularly worrisome in light
of the growing role of “new economy” markets that involve network effects
and economies of scale that often naturally tip these markets to dominance
or monopoly and lead to durable barriers to entry.115 These barriers can be
maintained or enhanced in the face of innovative potential entrants by
technological as well as traditional exclusionary conduct such as exclusive
dealing, tying, and vertical mergers, and various kinds of contractual
restraints, as well as by serial acquisition strategies that eliminate the most
promising potential competitors.116

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018).
Id. As Justice Breyer points out in dissent, the Court’s previous recognition that direct
evidence of competitive harm is sufficient to shift a burden of production to the defendant and
require a showing of procompetitive effects should have been “fully applicable” in the case. Id. at
2296 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer further observed that “[t]he majority thus, in a footnote, seems
categorically to exempt vertical restraints from the ordinary ‘rule of reason’ analysis that has applied
to them since the Sherman Act’s enactment in 1890” and adds that “[o]ne critical point that the
majority’s argument ignores is that proof of actual adverse effects on competition is, a fortiori, proof
of market power. Without such power, the restraints could not have brought about the
anticompetitive effects that the plaintiff proved.” Id. at 2297.
115 In the Second Edition of his antitrust law treatise, Judge Posner recognized the greater
concerns about exclusionary conduct in “new economy” markets such as internet platforms with
network effects. However, he still proposed that the monopolist is entitled to use practices that are
employed widely in industries that resemble the monopolist’s but are competitive. RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 253-54 (2d ed. 2001).
116 Indeed, while no single acquisition may be likely to “substantially lessen competition” and so
violate Section 7, the series might be susceptible to analysis as monopolizing conduct under Section 2.
113
114
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III. RECOMMENDED GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR OPERATIONALIZING
THE “ENQUIRY MEET FOR THE CASE” FOR ANTICOMPETITIVE
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
California Dental Ass’n,117 Leegin118 and Actavis119 invited courts to continue
to formulate evidentiary burdens, including presumptions, as they gain more
experience under the rule of reason. In response to that invitation, we propose
a set of “guiding principles” for courts evaluating the competitive effects of
exclusionary conduct. These proposals reflect decision theory, modern
economic analysis and legal precedent, and current market conditions. They
are intended to structure the inquiry in a rational way, correcting for the
various mistaken assumptions that exaggerate current perceptions of the
likelihood of false positives, understate concerns for false negatives, and
impose excessive burdens on plaintiffs.
In the conventional rule of reason decision framework, the plaintiff bears
the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence of likely competitive harm.
It can satisfy this burden with direct or circumstantial evidence, an appropriate
anticompetitive presumption, or some combination. If the plaintiff satisfies
this requirement, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to provide
justifications, that is, sufficient evidence of cognizable procompetitive benefits
of the challenged conduct.120 If the defendant satisfies this requirement, the
burden of production then shifts back to the plaintiff, who bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., that the conduct
is more likely to be anticompetitive than not.
This is a sliding scale standard in that stronger evidence of competitive
harm (or a stronger anticompetitive presumption) requires the defendant to
produce stronger evidence of efficiency benefits, and vice versa. A
procompetitive presumption analogously would require the plaintiff to
provide stronger evidence of competitive harm. The inevitable uncertainty
that accompanies antitrust decision-making requires reasonable means of

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-80 (1999).
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99 (2007) (“Courts
can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to
make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote
procompetitive ones.”).
119 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158-60 (2013).
120 A presumption may be rebutted by evidence undermining its basis or “affirmatively”
offsetting its implication. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
As one court recently held, however, the burden of pleading should be distinguished from the burden
of production. See Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 460 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[B]alancing
anticompetitive effects against hypothesized justifications depends on evidence and is not amenable
to resolution on the pleadings . . . .”); see also id. at 462 (“[T]he calculation of procompetitive
benefits net of anticompetitive harms does not easily lend itself to a pleading standard.”).
117
118
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assessing and determining the probability of competitive harm in the first
step, including the relevant presumptions.
We propose a number of principles to guide the implementation of this
framework, including the allocation of burdens and the adoption of
anticompetitive and procompetitive presumptions.
A. Basic Structure of the Inquiry and Allocation of Burdens
1. The Default Presumption Under the Rule of Reason Should Be
“Neutral” Competitive Effects
Civil antitrust claims generally do not warrant different treatment than
any other kind of civil enforcement. The rule of reason benchmark standard
requires the plaintiff to prove that anticompetitive effects are “more likely
than not,” or, as it applies to all civil antitrust cases, “by a preponderance of
the evidence.” This evidentiary standard is consistent with a “neutral”
presumption of likely competitive effects, that is, that the category of conduct
is no more likely to reduce consumer welfare than to increase welfare.121
For example, Leegin adopted the conventional rule of reason, which
requires the plaintiff to show likely anticompetitive effects by a
preponderance of the evidence. While it eliminated the previous
anticompetitive presumption, it also detailed circumstances under which
minimum resale price maintenance could be anticompetitive, and adopted a
neutral ex ante presumption, not a procompetitive presumption.
The next several principles explain the appropriate evidentiary burden
on the plaintiff.
2. The Plaintiff ’s Evidentiary Burden Should Not Be Elevated Ex Ante
a. The Plaintiff ’s Evidentiary Burden Should Be Probable Anticompetitive
Effects, Not Actual Anticompetitive Effects
As discussed in Part I, the rule of reason has always focused on probable
anticompetitive effects and “tendency.” It should be sufficient for the plaintiff
to satisfy its initial burden and shift the burden to the defendant by showing
either actual or probable anticompetitive harm, not definitive proof.

121 The fact that ties are resolved in favor of the defendant might suggest that the presumption is
“marginally procompetitive” rather than “neutral.” If so, the “margin” is considered very small. But see
generally Mungan & Wright, supra note 72 (advocating a higher than preponderance standard for antitrust).

2020]

Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens

2133

b. The Plaintiff ’s Evidentiary Burden Should Not Require Quantification
Courts should not require quantification of harm as part of the plaintiff’s
burden. Quantification evidence of “actual” harm is not required by the leading
cases, which simply recognize that direct evidence of likely harm obviates the
need for circumstantial proof.122 Moreover, imposing a requirement of evidence
of actual harm would move the needle from reasonable probability closer to a
standard of near-certainty more typically associated with criminal prosecution,
and likely would lead to excessive false negatives.
A quantification requirement would also add substantial and unnecessary
additional cost resulting from discovery and protracted litigation over expert
methodologies. No empirical methodology is perfect, and complete and
accurate information is likely to be rare, so some criticisms can be made of
even the most rigorous and careful empirical methodology. Evaluating the
importance of the criticisms can be difficult for generalist courts facing
significant docket pressures. This distortion is exacerbated by the fact that
the standard test for statistical significance of econometric results is focused
on avoiding false positives and places no value on avoiding false negatives.123
3. Direct Proof of Market Power or Anticompetitive Effects Should
Obviate the Need for Circumstantial Proof
When reliable direct evidence of market power or anticompetitive effect
is presented, courts should not require plaintiffs to also demonstrate market
power with circumstantial evidence by defining a relevant market, calculating
market shares, and evaluating barriers to entry. As the Court observed in
Indiana Federation of Dentists, market power inferred from market shares in a
defined market is a second best “surrogate” and is unnecessary when more
direct evidence of market power or anticompetitive effects is provided.
In evaluating exclusionary conduct, courts also should avoid the false
negatives that would result from failing to connect the market power analysis
to the allegations of anticompetitive effect. In a monopoly maintenance case,
for example, a court should not evaluate the profitability of price increases
since the allegation centers on conduct designed to prevent price decreases.124
Courts also should not immunize exclusionary conduct by monopolists by
122 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 103 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690 (1978).
123 Cf. Phillip Johnson, Edward Leamer & Jeffrey Leitzinger, Statistical Significance and
Statistical Error in Antitrust Analysis, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 641, 643 (2017) (arguing for an approach that
recognizes false negatives).
124 See Salop, supra note 30, at 194-201 (discussing the “Cellophane Trap” and variants in a first
principles approach).
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using a threshold market power filter to conclude that a firm lacks monopoly
power because it faces competition when it is accused of using that power to
impair or destroy those very competitors.
In American Express, the Court required the plaintiff to prove market power
in the two-sided platform with circumstantial evidence, despite the fact that
direct evidence of anticompetitive effects was provided and should have been
sufficient economic proof of market power.125 Imposing that additional
requirement is inefficient and merely raises the plaintiff ’s cost, while
potentially masking the defendant’s lack of sufficient justification because it
prevents the burden from shifting.126 It makes no economic or legal sense to
require inferior evidence when superior evidence already has been provided.
If the Court wished to raise the plaintiff ’s evidentiary burden, it would have
been better to require additional evidence of harm, as discussed below.127
4. Courts Should Set a Lower Burden on the Plaintiff in Exclusionary
Conduct Cases When the Defendant Has Substantial Market Power
Anticompetitive effects are more likely when the defendant has
substantial market power. Moreover, when the defendant has substantial
market power, the asymmetric litigation incentive effects from its higher
stakes can lead to false negatives. Both of these factors suggest that courts
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2288 (2018).
See supra note 114 (discussing Justice Breyer’s criticisms of the majority’s approach).
Consistent with Justice Breyer’s view, a majority of circuit courts have held that direct evidence is
sufficient to establish the monopoly power element of a claim of monopolization under Section 2.
See, e.g., Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village of Bellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 922 (7th Cir. 2019)
(finding that monopoly power can be established by either direct evidence of anticompetitive effects
or indirectly by establishing that the defendant possesses a significant share of the relevant market);
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 434 (3d Cir. 2016)
(“Monopoly power can be demonstrated through direct or indirect evidence.”); McWane, Inc. v.
FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 830 (11th Cir. 2015) (acknowledging that monopoly power can be shown with
direct proof “of the ability to profitably raise prices substantially above the competitive level”);
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The existence of monopoly
power may be proven through direct evidence of supracompetitive prices and restricted output.”);
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that one can establish
monopoly power with direct proof of its actual exercise); Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173
F.3d 995, 1018 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n antitrust plaintiff is not required to rely on indirect evidence
of a defendant's monopoly power, such as high market share within a defined market, when there is
direct evidence that the defendant has actually set prices or excluded competition.”); Tops Mkts.,
Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d. 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[Monopoly power] may be proven
directly by evidence of the control of prices or the exclusion of competition, or it may be inferred
from one firm’s large percentage share of the relevant market.”); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Market power may be demonstrated through either of two
types of proof. One type of proof is direct evidence of the injurious exercise of market power. If the
plaintiff puts forth evidence of restricted output and supracompetitive prices, that is direct proof
of . . . the actual exercise of market power.”).
127 See infra subsection III.B.2.
125
126
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should resist imposing elevated burdens on plaintiffs in such circumstances
and should instead impose a lower burden to reflect the greater probability of
competitive harm and the distinct challenges of litigation against a dominant
firm. This is consistent with the sliding scale and the view that behavior by
monopolists should be viewed through a “special lens,” precisely because their
power may provide them with the ability and incentive to engage in
exclusionary conduct.128 We are not, however, suggesting that substantial
market power without additional evidence warrants a presumption of
competitive harm.
As we have explained, many of the arguments that firms possessing
market power lack incentives to carry out exclusionary conduct have been
debunked. Market self-correction requires existing competitors or new
entrants that can expand in response to attempts to raise or maintain
monopoly prices. But monopoly power includes entry barriers, and
exclusionary conduct often raises barriers to entry. If there are no competitors
who are not subject to the exclusionary conduct, this self-correction process
cannot occur.129
The plaintiff ’s evidentiary burden also should be reduced to reflect the
asymmetric litigation stakes and the associated increased likelihood of false
negatives. As discussed earlier, these asymmetric stakes give defendants with
substantial market power systematic incentives to invest in relatively greater
litigation efforts. These asymmetric litigation incentives tilt outcomes in the
direction of excessive false negatives.
Despite the substantial harms caused by monopolizing conduct, the
plaintiff ’s burden in Section 2 monopolization cases often was treated as
higher. One reason was grounded in remedial concerns. The traditional
remedy for monopolization was “capital punishment,” the disintegration of
the firm into separate parts, as in Standard Oil,130 United Shoe Machinery,131 or

128 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are examined
through a special lens: Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws—or
that might even be viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced
by a monopolist.”); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc. 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Behavior
that otherwise might comply with antitrust law may be impermissibly exclusionary when practiced
by a monopolist.”).
129 As discussed earlier, counterstrategies by plaintiffs to outbid the monopolist to escape
exclusives are unlikely to succeed because of the monopolist’s greater stakes. See supra text
accompanying note 97.
130 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77-82 (1911) (ordering the dissolution
of Standard Oil).
131 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250-52 (1968) (discussing
conditions under which divestiture can be an appropriate remedy in a monopolization case).
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the United States v. AT&T settlement.132 But it is now recognized that
remedial concerns in Section 2 cases can be separated from liability standards
because other equitable remedies, such as divestitures short of complete
dissolution or behavioral remedies, may be mandated instead.133 A second
reason may have been the categorical assumption made explicit by the Court
in Copperweld that unilateral exclusionary conduct is less of a threat to
competition than is concerted action under Section 1.134 But concerted action
by smaller rivals in highly competitive markets is unlikely to threaten
competition to the same extent as unilateral exclusionary conduct by a firm
possessing substantial market power.
5. The Plaintiff ’s Initial Evidentiary Burden Should Be Reduced to Reflect
the Possible Absence of a Valid Efficiency Justification
The conventional statement of the burden-shifting rule of reason
typically suggests that the defendant’s justifications must be totally ignored
unless, and until, the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence of competitive
harm, where that evidence does not include any reference to the possible
lack of cognizable justifications. Such a rigid sequencing approach can lead
to excessive false negatives.135
Evaluating competitive harm first and in isolation in exclusionary conduct
cases involving dominant firms is not compelled or even suggested by decision
theory136 and doing so is inconsistent with a sliding scale approach to the burden

132 United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 160-70 (D.D.C. 1982) (determining that the
proposed divestiture from AT& T is in the public interest).
133 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 105-07 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding
for consideration of whether divestiture is an appropriate remedy); see also ANDREW I. GAVIL &
HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES 237-38 (2014) (discussing theoretical
framework for remedies in monopolization cases).
134 Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-69 (1984).
135 In his dissent in McWane, Commissioner Wright placed a high evidentiary burden (i.e.,
“clear evidence”) on the plaintiff to establish competitive harm in the first step to take account of
his view that the defendant’s conduct was presumptively procompetitive. He concluded that the
plaintiff failed this first step, so he never analyzed the validity of the defendant’s procompetitive
claims. In fact, they were found by the Commission (and the Eleventh Circuit) to be pretextual and
invalid. But Commissioner Wright never analyzed them or contemplated the possibility that they
might be pretextual, thereby seeking to impose an overly high bar on the plaintiff ’s proof of harm
in the first step. McWane, Inc., Docket No. 9351, 50-52 (F.T.C. Feb. 6, 2014) (Dissenting Statement
of
Commissioner
Joshua
D.
Wright),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/202211/140206mcwanestatement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LT8E-G6HW].
136 See Beckner & Salop, supra note 61, at 69 (“Thus, in decision theoretic terms, the benefit of
gathering information on efficiencies exceeds the benefit of gathering information about market
power harms. On the cost side, the view seems to be that it is relatively more difficult to gather
information on implicit market power harms than on efficiency benefits.”).
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of proof, which evaluates all of the evidence.137 Moreover, the courts have long
acknowledged that evidence of the defendant’s purpose in adopting certain
restraints can be probative for evaluating the likelihood of competitive effects.138
The absence of a cognizable justification, for example, can strengthen a
presumption of harm.139
If consideration of the justifications is deferred, then the plaintiff ’s burden
to show competitive harm should be set at a low level to account for the fact
that any efficiency claims may turn out to be pretextual, invalid, or very small.
This approach would allow the sequential burden-shifting structure to be
maintained without causing excessive false negatives.140
6. The Defendant Should Not Be Able to Meet Its Burden of Production
to Show Cognizable Efficiency Benefits Based on Purely Categorical
Justifications
Categorical justifications are often urged by defendants and conservative
commentators to support procompetitive presumptions. But general
categorical evidence of benefits, especially when based on evidence from
competitive markets, as is often the case, should not be sufficient to carry the
defendant’s burden once the plaintiff produces evidence of probable
competitive harm. Case-specific evidence then must be produced to support
efficiency claims to support the application of the theory to the particular
case. Permitting purely theoretical justifications to satisfy the defendant’s
burden in a particular case would amount to a sub rosa presumption and would
lead to excessive false negatives. Justifications must be evaluated solely with
the case-specific evidence when there is no procompetitive presumption. For
137 Sequential analysis fits better in the context of motion practice, such as summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law, both of which specifically test the non-movant’s ability to meet its
burden of production when the non-movant bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
138 See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[K]nowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.”). Applied to
monopolization under Section 2, the Court in Aspen Skiing inferred anticompetitive purpose from
the defendant’s lack of a valid efficiency benefit. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 608 n.39 (1985) (“[I]ntent to engage in predation may be in the form of . . . evidence
that the conduct was not related to any apparent efficiency.”) (quoting BORK, supra note 17, at 157); see
also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Evidence of the intent
behind the conduct of a monopolist is relevant . . . to the extent it helps us understand the likely
effect of the monopolist’s conduct.”). In McWane, the court discussed the evidence of McWane’s
anticompetitive purpose in its discussion of the plaintiff ’s evidence of competitive harm. McWane,
Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 840 (11th Cir. 2015).
139 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof ’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (“The
Society’s affirmative defense confirms rather than refutes the anticompetitive purpose and effect of
its agreement.”).
140 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision
Procedures, 132 HARV. L. REV. 992, 997-1003 (2019).
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example, the fact that some exclusive dealing arrangements may be
procompetitive does not mean that the one at issue is procompetitive.
This is consistent with the treatment of theoretical evidence of
competitive harm. A plaintiff may be able to defeat a motion to dismiss if it
explains its theory of harm and if its claim is supported by allegations
sufficient to make the claim plausible. But case-specific evidence is required
to avoid summary judgement. The same approach should be followed with
respect to theoretical evidence of efficiency benefits.
7. Courts Should Subject Defendant’s Justifications to a Less Restrictive
Alternative Standard
Courts should consider whether the claimed procompetitive benefits can
be achieved in large part through less restrictive alternatives that involve
significantly lessened competitive concerns. For example, once a defendant
has shifted the burden back to the plaintiff by showing a procompetitive
justification, the plaintiff should be able to shift the burden back to the
defendant by identifying a plausible less restrictive alternative. At that point
the burden would shift back to the defendant to demonstrate why that
alternative is not feasible or would not achieve most or substantially all of the
efficiency benefits. This allocation of burdens makes sense since the
defendant has superior information regarding efficiencies.141
B. Guiding Principles for Adopting Procompetitive Presumptions for Exclusionary
Conduct by Firms with Substantial Market Power
1. Substantial Evidence Should Be Required to Justify Procompetitive
Presumptions
In light of the heightened concern about the anticompetitive effects of
exclusionary conduct by firms with substantial market power, adoption of
procompetitive presumptions for such conduct should be rare and endorsed
only under exceptional circumstances. Compared to the state of antitrust law
in the 1960s, defendants today have far more effective and robust procedural
options at hand to identify and eliminate truly weak antitrust claims through
motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and motions to exclude
expert testimony. Procompetitive presumptions, therefore, should be

141 See C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
927, 982 (2016) (arguing that although plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion, defendants should
bear a burden of production because, among other reasons, they “have better access to information
about their reasons for adopting a particular practice”). See generally Kaplow, supra note 140, at 100315 (discussing how less restrictive alternatives analysis fits in with structured decision procedures).
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narrowly tailored and justified by substantial theoretical or empirical
categorical evidence.
a. Narrow Categories
Presumptions involving categories of conduct should be narrowly drawn
and courts should be cautious about generalizing either from one type of
conduct to another or from conduct in competitive settings to that in highly
concentrated markets. The fact that a class of conduct sometimes creates
plausible procompetitive benefits may be a reason to reject an irrebuttable
anticompetitive presumption, but it does not justify a procompetitive
presumption. Moreover, the fact that certain conduct is carried out by firms
lacking market power in competitive markets does not mean that such
conduct would be procompetitive in an oligopoly market or when
implemented by a firm with substantial market power. Even if the conduct
has some procompetitive benefits, it may be anticompetitive in a particular
case because the market context is different.142 Thus, while that evidence may
be probative in a particular case, where the conditions are sufficiently similar,
it cannot justify a procompetitive presumption.
For example, while conceding that vertical intrabrand restraints can have
procompetitive virtues and therefore did not warrant per se condemnation,
neither Leegin nor Sylvania endorsed a presumption that they were more
likely procompetitive than anticompetitive. Instead, both restored a neutral
competitive presumption.143 Similarly, the fact that certain intrabrand vertical
restraints may be useful in achieving procompetitive efficiencies does not
mean that a procompetitive presumption should be applied to interbrand
vertical restraints. Neither Leegin nor Sylvania made judgments about
interbrand vertical restraints with possible exclusionary effects, such as
exclusive dealing or most-favored nation (MFN) provisions.144
Similarly, just as the fact that certain conduct is “horizontal” does not
automatically justify an anticompetitive presumption, “vertical” conduct
should not lead automatically to a procompetitive presumption. Labelling the
conduct as “horizontal” or “vertical,” without more, provides insufficient
information to formulate any generally applicable presumption. While
conduct might be vertical in form, any anticompetitive effects are
horizontal.145
It also may be the case that smaller firms are simply imitating the behavior of the dominant firm.
Studies of the mixed impact of resale price maintenance on welfare during periods when it
was legal were discussed in Leegin. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
893, 895, 900 (2007).
144 See, e.g., United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Although not illegal
in themselves, exclusive dealing arrangements can be an improper means of maintaining a monopoly.”).
145 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728-30 (1988).
142
143
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b. False Positives and False Negatives
Chicago School claims about false negatives were formulated at a time
when courts were relying on relatively low burdens of proof and arguably
expansive anticompetitive presumptions, including a number of per se
prohibitions. Those concerns are now anachronistic and largely overstated
given the evolution of the conventional rule of reason. The enforcement
agencies and the courts also have become more knowledgeable and
experienced in evaluating economic evidence. For this reason, it makes sense
today to assume that the error costs from false positives and false negatives
are relatively equal. Substantial evidence about the particular category of
conduct should be required, therefore, to justify placing greater weight on
false positives.
It will seldom be possible to gauge the impact of alternative legal rules
(aside from per se rules) on deterrence. If the legal standard is stable, it is hard
to quantify the relative number and competitive impact of additional false
negatives versus fewer false positives if the law were made more permissive.146
However, deterrence policy concerns could alter the presumption in highly
exceptional circumstances. For example, Brooke Group created a
procompetitive presumption for price cuts in response to competition that
remain above costs based on the view that such price cuts are a natural
competitive response, immediately benefit consumers, and any line drawing
by courts would lead to a severe risk of deterring beneficial price cuts.147
2. When an Appropriate Procompetitive Presumption Is Adopted, It
Should Raise the Plaintiff ’s Burden to Show Competitive Harm, Not
Append Additional Evidentiary Requirements
If it is appropriate to place a higher burden of proof on the plaintiff, the
rule of reason can accommodate that standard by requiring the plaintiff to
prove that the conduct “produce harms disproportionate to the resulting
benefits,” as suggested by Professor Hovenkamp.148 By contrast, in setting a
higher burden on the plaintiff (apparently because the conduct was labeled
“vertical”), the Court in American Express required the plaintiff to prove
market power by circumstantial evidence despite the fact that better, direct
146 See generally Alexander MacKay & David Aron Smith, The Empirical Effects of Minimum
Resale Price Maintenance (Chi. Booth Kilts Ctr. for Mktg., Paper No. 2-006, 2014),
http://alexandermackay.org/files/The%20Empirical%20Effects%20of%20MRPM.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8AGC-5CF9].
147 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-26 (1993).
148 Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 148 (2005)
(citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA AND HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3 ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 651a, at 72 (Aspen 2d ed. 2002)).
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evidence of anticompetitive effects was already provided.149 Even if it were
justified, it would have made more sense for the Court to require a stronger
showing of anticompetitive effects, rather than adding unnecessary evidence
of market power simply as a make-weight.150
As another example, it has been suggested that the plaintiff should be
required to provide evidence that the defendant’s conduct would make “no
economic sense” in the absence of gaining monopoly power in addition to
evidence of anticompetitive effects.151 This approach would redirect the rule
of reason inquiry away from its proper, sole focus on competitive effects.
Instead of merely showing that the challenged conduct was anticompetitive,
plaintiffs would also have to show something completely different: that the
conduct would not have been profitable for the dominant firm absent its
contribution to the maintenance of market power.152
3. Alleged Innovation Benefits of Monopoly Should Not Justify a
Procompetitive Presumption for Exclusionary Conduct by Firms with
Substantial Market Power
Courts should not permit monopolists to justify exclusionary conduct by
arguing that their resulting monopoly profits will spur future innovation. As
discussed earlier, economic analysis and associated empirical evidence do not
support the general claim that a monopoly market structure leads to more
innovation. While firms innovate in the hopes of achieving a monopoly,
achieving a durable monopoly does not lead to more future innovation. To the
contrary, significant evidence suggests that competition, not monopoly, spurs
innovation.153 It is fear of losing the monopoly that spurs the monopolist.
Moreover, if the exclusionary conduct raises competitors’ costs or barriers to
Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018).
Brooke Group again is an exception to this principle in that it added the below-cost pricing
prong to its standard for evaluation of competitive price cuts. 509 U.S. at 223.
151 See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The ‘No
Economic Sense’ Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 417, 426 (2006) (explaining how the “no economic
sense” test is used to distinguish between exclusionary and competitive acts); see also A. Douglas
Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are There Unifying
Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 389-403 (2006) (endorsing a similar “sacrifice test”).
152 The Department of Justice unsuccessfully advocated this test to the Supreme Court in
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-11 (2004), and to the
D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001), which
affirmatively rejected it in favor of a focus on competitive effects.
153 See Baker, supra note 15, at 13-14 (“[G]reater competition is commonly more important for
enhancing innovation incentives than the greater appropriability that a monopoly could confer.”);
Baker, supra note 103, at 576 (“[A]ntitrust intervention can systematically promote innovation
competition and pre-innovation product market competition, which will encourage
innovation . . . .”); Shapiro, supra note 102, at 362-63, 401 (“[I]nnovation, broadly defined, is spurred
if the market is contestable; that is, if multiple firms are vying to win profitable future sales.”).
149
150
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entry, innovation by potential rivals would be expected to fall, which would
reduce the monopolist’s need to innovate. Permitting this justification is also
contrary to overarching antitrust policy favoring an unencumbered competitive
process, and it distorts the incentives for monopolists in favor of exclusionary
strategies rather than competition on the merits.
4. Complaints About Exclusionary Conduct by a Competitor Neither
Justify a Procompetitive Presumption nor an Imposition of a Higher
Evidentiary Burden on the Plaintiff
Competitors serve as an early tripwire for competitive concerns about
exclusionary conduct. The interests of foreclosed competitors are consistent
with consumer welfare in exclusionary conduct cases since raising rivals’ costs
will lead to higher consumer prices, so the rivals’ harm is antitrust injury. The
shibboleth that antitrust law protects “competition, not competitors” should
not be used to dismiss legitimate exclusionary conduct concerns of rivals or
to attack the credibility of their testimony on the grounds that it reflects their
“self-interest[s].”154 Nor should courts treat the testimony of competitor
witnesses as less credible than the testimony of the executives of a defendant’s
company, whose testimony also reflects their own interests, which may be to
achieve or maintain market power. “Shoot the messenger” as a defense
strategy should be rejected as distraction.
CONCLUSION
The capacity of antitrust law to identify, redress, and deter anticompetitive
exclusionary conduct has been systematically weakened over time. While there
was a need for certain adjustments fifty years ago, continued reliance on the
assumptions and presumptions that led to an overly permissive approach are
no longer supportable. The evidentiary burdens courts now impose on
plaintiffs are overly demanding and likely lead to under-deterrence. They are
also handicapping the ability of antitrust enforcement to respond to the
challenges of today’s technology-driven economy.
We have explained how current law is flexible enough again to adjust its
standards in light of modern economic analysis informed by decision theory.
We have also proposed a number of guiding principles to update standards of
proof, including the use of presumptions. In this way, the sliding-scale
“enquiry meet for the case” can be implemented for the current market
environment. As now-Judge Frank Easterbrook once argued, there is no
natural “ratchet” in antitrust law that channels its evolution only in one

154

United States v. AT & T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 211 (D.D.C. 2018).
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direction.155 For Easterbrook, that meant imposing more demanding
standards of proof. But the same lack of ratchet should apply today as the
continuing evolution of technology markets and modern economics suggest
that greater antitrust vigilance is needed.

155

Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 706 (1982).
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